HOUSTON — Despite it being almost impossible to avoid on any form of social media, and the replays being shown constantly on MLB Network and ESPN over the past 24 hours, manager Scott Servais hasn’t watched or dissected the video of Yordan Alvarez sending a sinker from Robbie Ray into orbit for a three-run walkoff homer in the Astros’ stunning 8-7 victory Tuesday in Game 1 of the American League Division Series.
Realistically, the pitch, the swing and the result are probably embedded into a near-constant loop in his immediate memory, even if he says he’s moving forward.
On Wednesday afternoon at an empty Minute Maid Park, Servais had to relive the moment that may be impossible to forget, depending on the series outcome, and answer a question on the thought process that led to it.
Over the past 24 hours, the consternation and criticism of bringing in Ray, who was rocked three days earlier in Toronto and has been roughed up by Houston all season, to face Alvarez — one of the best hitters in baseball — has been palpable if not incessant.
In the immediate aftermath of the loss, Servais said the team had decided to leave Ray out of the starting rotation, but possibly use him in situations where Alvarez or Kyle Tucker, the other lefty slugger in Houston’s lineup, might come to the plate.
But what went into a plan to think Ray was the best option?
Prior to every series and every game, the Mariners develop pitching plans, particularly for bullpen usage. It’s based on matchups, advanced scouting reports, in-house data based on the Mariners proprietary analytics and algorithms, overall reliever health, prior usage, availability of relievers and more.
These meetings consist of Servais, pitching coach Pete Woodworth, bullpen coach Trent Blank, members of the baseball operations and analytics staff, advance scouts and others in the organization. The Mariners have more daily meetings than any team in baseball, and a daily pitching meeting is paramount.
“Obviously, it didn’t work yesterday, but that has nothing to do with our process,” Servais said. “We have a really good process.”
“A lot of it is tied into who is available, what the matchups are, and what our matchup numbers are, they’re developed by us, just like every team has an analytical group that puts all the information together and it spits out a number to me and my coaching staff and the whole strategic group that puts together game plans and how we’re going to use guys,” he continued. “So you rely on it. You stay true to the process and understanding the pieces you have available that day to go ahead and hopefully finish off the game. It didn’t happen yesterday. It didn’t work out.”
But Servais wasn’t finished in his filibuster of a first answer that he later admitted was long-winded.
“I don’t know if anybody remembers, but just a couple days ago we were in Toronto, and George Kirby got the last three outs in a position he had never been in, in his life. Why did we make that decision at that time? Because our process led us to that decision. And it worked great. … Just like yesterday, we thought at that time it made the best decision to allow us to win the game.
“I said when the playoffs started, the beauty of the playoffs is there’s so many eyes and there’s so much at stake and the thing we forget oftentimes is the best players in the world are playing at this time. It’s a really good team we’re playing.”
With Kirby slotted to start Game 3 on Saturday, which Servais later confirmed, he wasn’t available to pitch in relief. The rookie right-hander might have been the best pitcher to have some success against Alvarez.
Often in baseball, the strategy of bringing in a left-handed pitcher to neutralize a good left-handed hitter is commonplace. But it doesn’t neutralize Alvarez, who’s “split resistant,” meaning he hits all pitching.
In a season where he will garner some Top 10 votes for American League MVP, Alvarez had 369 plate appearances vs. right-handed pitchers, posting a .299/.404/.627 slash line with 16 doubles, 27 homers and 64 RBI. In 93 plate appearances vs. left-handed pitchers, Alvarez had a .321/.412/.586 slash line with 13 doubles, 10 homers and 33 RBI.
Bringing in Ray wasn’t about a getting a lefty vs. lefty matchup.
“Yordan Álvarez is very good left on left,” Servais said. “We know that going into it. I’m looking at the numbers that are in front of me, I trust them, and what plays into that is not just the handedness of the pitcher, but what that hitter hits, what that pitcher fires out there. Now you’ve got to get the ball, you’ve got to execute, you’ve got to get the ball in the right spots, and hopefully it leads you to the result you’re looking for.”
Servais wouldn’t offer a look into the processing over those numbers.
“To break it all down and tell you how the soup is made, I’m probably not going to do that for you,” he said. “Why would I? Every team has information like that, and you’re trying to predict the future, but the game is played by humans. The guys out there, they’re athletes, there’s a lot that plays into it. You have to go out and execute it and hopefully it goes your way. Even if you execute sometimes, the guys on the other team are good, too, at this time of year.”
Alvarez has very few holes in his approach. He hits pretty much every type of pitch with authority. From MLB Statcast data, Alvarez’s success vs. specific pitches from left-handers in 2022:
- Four-seam fastballs (254) — .378 AVG / .892 SLG/ 5 HR / 98 mph avg exit velocity
- Slider (182) — .341 AVG / .659 SLG / 3 HR / 91.9 mph avg exit velocity
- Sinker (180) — .288 AVG/ .404 SLG/ 1 HR / 96.4 avg exit velocity
- Curveball (62) — .400 AVG/ .500 SLG/ 0 HR / 90 mph avg. exit velocity
- Changeup (32) — .364 AVG/ .727 SLG / 1 HR / 106.5 avg exit velocity
The plan for Ray was to use the sinker to get inside on Alvarez’s hands and get weak contact. If Ray threw a slider, it needed to be below the strike zone. And any four-seam fastball couldn’t be a strike.
A deeper look at Statcast data shows that of the 103 sinkers thrown to Alvarez by lefties to the inside part of the zone or inside and not a strike, he has just two hits on 27 balls in play — both singles.
Ray fired a first-pitch sinker at 94 mph that was on the outside half of the plate. Alvarez was ready for it and fouled it straight back. Instead of burying a slider in the dirt to see if Alvarez might chase or change his timing, Ray threw another sinker that didn’t get inside.
Alvarez put it into the upper deck, with the ball leaving his bat at 117 mph.
“I was just trying to get the sinker in on him,” Ray said postgame. “It just didn’t get there.”
Asked if he analyzed his decision postgame and had any second thoughts, Servais replied:
“We’re human, right?” he said. “That’s the game. You go back and you think, ‘What could I have done different or what should we have done different?’ And at the end of the day, if you truly believe in what you’re doing and the people around you and you take all the information in, you make the best decision you can at that moment and you move forward.”