January 7th, 2017 by Jan Bultmann
I’ll admit it; I was one of the people who never in her wildest dreams imagined that our nation would elect Trump, even with the help of Russia, hackers, voter suppression laws, and all the other evils people talked about before the election.
So I’ve been pulling myself together after a period of paralysis.
I can’t see this as anything but a huge setback for all civil rights activists everywhere.
I wonder what will happen to privacy activists as the new junta inherits the surveillance state.
Meanwhile I’m looking for ideas about resistance. This online guide, Indivisible, compiled by former progressive congressional staffers, is very aligned with the principles under which Seattle Privacy was founded: the idea that we in the public can positively influence the actions of our elected officials. At Seattle Privacy we address the municipal government, but Indivisible explains how the Tea Party managed to influence Congress, despite having a minority (and toxic) viewpoint.
In some ways “working to change the system from within” seems quaint now, in the post-Truth era. The morning of the day I wrote this, Trump declared that his takeaway from meeting with the IC was that the election was won by him fair and square. This is literally an insane interpretation of what they reported.
Anyway, I’m reading Indivisible and getting ready to go out and bother representatives at public events, and I encourage everyone interested in civil rights to do the same.
January 19th, 2015 by yawnbox
The Seattle Privacy Coalition instructed our first anonymous group of Seattleites who are victims of abusive surveillance or at risk of becoming a victim. Overwhelmingly, the students of our first workshop were women, even though everyone that attended ranged in age, background, race, nationality, ethnicity, and sexual-orientation. Despite their differences, their commonality was their genuine care for people — society — to such a degree that their non-violent actions are considered a threat to corporate and government power.
Almost 226 years ago, our fundamental rights as Americans were ratified. Broad protections were guaranteed to us against search and seizure, something that we, as a society, now sometimes call privacy due to the large amount of our lives willingly and unwillingly propelled into digital spaces. Objection to intrusive search and seizure of physical objects has evolved into our ability to control personal information made harder by advancing and cheapening technology.
Corporations, governments, and law enforcement agencies do not have a right to abuse people by way of deploying advanced technology. They may have the ability and privilege to do so, but that ability and privilege cannot and should not become a slippery slope to control people who are exercising their government-sponsored and government-protected right to protest perceived abuses of power. What is the significance of our constitutional protections unless we act, so that our rights become right and our values proven?
Despite the stark ethical differences between rights and privileges, activists are readily harassed, stalked, physically abused, or murdered. Anyone guided by justifiability and morality can understand why we need to support this vulnerable population of people.
In large part, surveillance self-defense is about technology and education. Similar to the practice of martial arts, self-defense is learned by empowering one’s self with knowledge and control over mind, body, and environment. Understanding technological threats and assets will help non-violent activists achieve their goals. To best achieve our objectives, we approached this training with the wisdom of a teacher and also the curiosity of a student. Everyone there had something to share and learn.
Our students were not tech-savvy. Many of them had cell phones that were merely recommended to them by family members or casual friends. One of them had a Windows phone, something even our technologists didn’t know if it employs storage encryption. Even though only one person was the facilitator over the course of almost five hours of training, various Seattle Privacy Coalition co-educators were participants of the training and regularly contributed facts, metaphors, and applied real-time research.
We started off by introducing the Seattle Privacy Coalition and notable facts about the organizers, like not being associated with law enforcement or intelligence services. A story was told to create some initial privacy empowerment and a statement about everyone’s right to identity-self-determination while participating in the workshop.
We started our curriculum by highlighting the cause of risk, which can be characterized by a balance between threat and vulnerability. Throughout the workshop, distinctions were made by attributing the specifics of scenarios to either a threat or a vulnerability to best appreciate any given risk.
The first tool provided to our students was not software; it was an information resource, one regularly brought back into the dialogue. The Electronic Frontier Foundation‘s (EFF) online guide titled “Surveillance Self Defense” (SSD) was chosen to be our primary reference material. Their amazing and much needed work is where we got the name of our new program. We think that the EFF’s SSD should discuss the notion of a vulnerability, not just the notion of a threat when assessing risk regarding “An Introduction to Threat Modeling“.
Another SSD concern was the need for a preemptive list of jargon in each article. As you might notice, one of the Seattle Privacy Coalition’s goals is to provide constructive feedback to the EFF from our experiences with our activist and journalist students.
Graciously, one of our students enjoyed sharing the words of every acronym that we used to instruct with. It was a healthy reminder that our students need a lot of breakdown, which in effect, leads to a lot of segues. Seattle Privacy Coalition needs to include more subtle structure into our curriculum plans so not to spend as much time on segues. Segues created a condition where it became too easy for non-technologists to get lost. We regularly asked if everyone were comfortable with the previously discussed topic so people could easily ask questions.
Other over-arching concepts included the differences between active and passive surveillance, and also the differences between transport encryption and encrypted storage. The Seattle Privacy Coalition needs to add a section disusing a basic concept of encryption in our upcoming workshops.
The majority of our students were iOS and OS X users, which was slightly unfortunate since we don’t have any Apple users among the active Seattle Privacy Coalition volunteers. Creating power users out of Apple users was a clear challenge in our workshop, but we were able to educate on a few important self-defense tactics and operations.
Regardless of the lack of Apple iOS and OS X experience, we were able to cover many outstanding encryption tools. We only instructed on the use of open source tools made by The Guardian Project, Open Whisper Systems, and The Tor Project . We limited our tools training to these developers because of their commitment to human rights, attention to usability, and their verifiable skills at employing strong encryption through careful software development.
We covered topics like “data linkability” and applied its concept throughout the workshop. We covered notions of “metadata” and applied its concept throughout the workshop. We covered search and seizure laws and rights. We covered Washington state audio and video recording laws and responsibilities. We made sure every Android and iOS user had storage encryption enabled. We also discussed OTR advantages in light of the above chosen software tools.
We spent a lot of time talking about cell phone communication encryption as a matter of risk deterrence. We did this by covering basic cellular network infrastructure and various vulnerabilities. Discussing SS7 vulnerabilities, baseband processor vulnerabilities, and IMSI-catcher threat detection was a primary knowledge area that we think is critically important for activists.
With only five hours before everyone was completely wiped, we barely had enough time to cover the proper use of Tor. Regrettably, Tor was talked about only as a solution. We did not comprehensively discuss threats and vulnerabilities. We did not have enough time to include any hands-on exercises which we think is ideal for showing activists how easy it is to install and use the above mentioned software tools. We also were not able to talk about HTTPS or PKI, which would have been useful after a basic intro to encryption.
Lastly, while we were able to discuss contact management for cell phones, we did not discuss contact management for personal computers. In fact, while 5 hours is a lot of time, we had no time for talking about personal computer hardening aside from a few brief mentions of Tails Linux. The only attendees to raise their hands as being Linux users were those from the Seattle Privacy Coalition.
Everyone walked away having learned many important things, and with a some healthy paranoia. Seattle Privacy Coalition volunteers learned a lot too, particularly about the nature of this specific underrepresented community in Seattle. The Seattle City Council is advised by the Citizens Technology and telecommunications Advisory Board (CTTAB), and in a couple months, CTTAB will be hosting a privacy symposium specifically looking at underrepresented communities that are often hurt by data mismanagement or surveillance. Activists are not only underrepresented, they’re often abused and misunderstood by capitalists, politicians, and journalists. We hope that these surveillance self-defense workshops will help our fellow residents, our city, and our perception of privacy moving forward.
July 22nd, 2014 by Jan Bultmann
Our allies over at the Privacy Project publish a weekly update of privacy issues in the news broken out by government, tech, international issues, and general interest. They are also here in the Pacific Northwest and often list issues of interest to Seattle Privacy. For example, this week they point to:
To see the complete update and sign up their RSS feed, visit the Privacy Project.
May 3rd, 2014 by Jan Bultmann
We’ve been looking around for tools and practices that Seattle city government could leverage to make progress in protecting the privacy of Seattlites, and we’ve run across Privacy Impact Assessments, or PIAs, and Chief Privacy Officers, or CPOs.
We’re still researching them, but PIAs seem like they could be deployed with respect to municipal departments and programs in a way similar to how the Racial Equity Toolkit is used in Seattle now.
The Racial Equity Toolkit is a tool from the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative, a citywide effort to end institutionalized racism and race-based disparities in City government. RSJI builds on the work of the civil rights movement and the ongoing efforts of individuals and groups in Seattle to confront racism. The Initiative’s long term goal is to change the underlying system that creates race-based disparities in Seattle and to achieve racial equity.designed to assist departments to analyze the racial equity impact of policies, programs, initiatives, and budget issues.
You can download a PDF of the Racial Equity Toolkit here, and see the worksheet designed to help city departments evaluate their programs. We’re proud of Seattle City government’s commitment to social justice and the City’s commitment of time and resources to addressing this issue.
We’d love to see a similar spirit of problem-solving brought to the ever-growing problem of privacy protection, and we’re wondering if the adopting of PIAs might be a step in that direction.
A privacy impact assessment is a tool organizations can use to identify and reduce privacy risks for their projects.
Here are a couple of useful links for examples of PIAs, pointed to by Adam Shostack in his new book Threat Modeling: Designing for Security:
And more examples we’ve found online:
Here’s a PDF of a code of practice for creating and performing privacy impact assessments created by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s office.
Here’s an excerpt where the code defines physical and informational privacy and explains the concept of privacy risk:
“Privacy, in its broadest sense, is about the right of an individual to be let alone. It can take two main forms, and these can be subject to different types of intrusion:
- Physical privacy – the ability of a person to maintain their own physical space or solitude. Intrusion can come in the form of unwelcome searches of a person’s home or personal possessions, bodily searches or other interference, acts of surveillance and the taking of biometric information.
- Informational privacy – the ability of a person to control, edit, manage and delete information about themselves and to decide how and to what extent such information is communicated to others. Intrusion can come in the form of collection of excessive personal information, disclosure of personal information without consent and misuse of such information. It can include the collection of information through the surveillance or monitoring of how people act in public or private spaces and through the monitoring of communications whether by post, phone or online and extends to monitoring the records of senders and recipients as well as the content of messages.”
The code is mostly designed to address informational privacy. Here’s a nice summary of privacy risk — the risk of harm arising through an intrusion into privacy.
“Some of the ways this risk can arise is through personal information being:
- Inaccurate, insufficient or out of date;
- Excessive or irrelevant;
- Kept for too long;
- Disclosed to those who the person it is about does not want to have it;
- Used in ways that are unacceptable to or unexpected by the person it is about; or
- Not kept securely.
Harm can present itself in different ways. Sometimes it will be tangible and quantifiable, for example financial loss or losing a job. At other times it will be less defined, for example damage to personal relationships and social standing arising from disclosure of confidential or sensitive information. Sometimes harm might still be real even if it is not obvious, for example the fear of identity theft that comes from knowing that the security of information could be compromised. There is also harm which goes beyond the immediate impact on individuals. The harm arising from use of personal information may be imperceptible or inconsequential to individuals, but cumulative and substantial in its impact on society. It might for example contribute to a loss of personal autonomy or dignity or exacerbate fears of excessive surveillance.”
Visit the UK Information Commissioner’s Office website for more information about the agency’s code of practice here.
For in-depth discussion and description of Chief Privacy Officers, see Chief Privacy Officer, US Department of Education, or Authorities and Responsibilities of the Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security, or Chief Privacy Author, IT Law Wiki.
April 28th, 2014 by Jan Bultmann
From the Social Science Research Network, here’s a downloadable PDF from Daniel Solove, privacy law professor at George Washington University Law School, and well-known privacy scholar: A Brief History of Information Privacy Law.
This book chapter provides a brief history of information privacy law in the United States from colonial times to the present. It discusses the followoing:
- Development of the common law torts
- Fourth Amendment law
- Constitutional right to information privacy
- Numerous federal statutes pertaining to privacy
- Electronic surveillance laws, and more.
The chapter explores how the law has emerged and changed in response to new technologies that have increased the collection, dissemination, and use of personal information.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46